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We study a many-country endogenous growth model in which decisions about 
innovation and new investment are influenced by growth expectations. Adaptive 
learning dynamics determine the country-specific short-run transition paths. The 
countries differ in basic structural parameters and may impose tariffs on imports 
of capital goods. Numerical experiments illustrate the adjustment dynamics that 
follow the use of tariffs. We show that countries that limit trade in capital goods 
can experience dynamic gains both in growth and in utility and that such gains 
persist longer the larger the structural advantages of the region that applies tariffs. 
Substantial differences in levels of innovation, consumption, output and utility can 
appear, and asymmetries in economic outcomes that were present before trade 
restrictions are made more severe. 
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Tässä työssä tarkastellaan usean avotalouden tapauksessa odotuksiin perustuvan 
talouden kasvudynamiikan ominaisuuksia. Kasvudynamiikkaa selitetään ns. endo-
geenisen kasvun mallilla, jossa tulevaan kasvuun liittyvät odotukset vaikuttavat 
yritysten innovaatio- ja investointipolitiikkaan. Odotustenmuodostus mallinnetaan 
työssä käyttämällä adaptiivista oppimismekanismia, joka puolestaan määrää yksit-
täisten maiden lyhyen aikavälin kasvudynamiikkaa. Maat ovat rakenteellisilta 
ominaisuuksiltaan erilaisia, ja ne voivat tulli- ja maksupolitiikan avulla rajoittaa 
investointitavaroiden tuontia. Työssä tullien käytöstä syntyvää sopeutumis-
dynamiikkaa luonnehditaan mallin numeeristen ratkaisujen avulla. Niiden mukaan 
yksittäiset maat voivat joksikin aikaa kiihdyttää talouskasvuaan ja kohentaa 
hyvinvointiaan rajoittamalla investointitavaroiden kansainvälistä kauppaa. Lisäksi 
talouden ja hyvinvoinnin kasvusta saatava hyöty on sitä pitkäkestoisempi, mitä 
parempi on tullipolitiikkaa soveltavan maan rakenteellinen etulyöntiasema. Inno-
vaatioiden määrässä, kulutuksessa, kokonaistuotannossa ja hyvinvoinnissa syntyy 
huomattavia eroja maiden välillä ja tullipolitiikan kiristymistä edeltävät epäsym-
metrisyydet talouksien suoriutumisessa voivat kärjistyä. Tullien käytön pitkän 
aikavälin vaikutukset vakaan kasvun uraan ovat kuitenkin erisuuntaiset kuin 
sopeutumisdynamiikan alkuvaiheessa. 
 
Avainsanat: endogeeninen kasvu, odotukset, oppiminen, lyhyen aikavälin dyna-
miikka, tullit, komplementaariset investointitavarat 
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Whether openness toward international trade contributes toward faster growth
is a topic of considerable theoretical and empirical interest. While theory gen-
erally obtains a positive connection, empirical work has found it diﬃcult to
establish a solid causality between trade and growth. The vast literature on
the contribution of trade to economic growth has recently been summarized in
Estevadeordal and Taylor (2008). We take a novel viewpoint on this issue by
examining the evolution of economies as a sequence of temporary equilibria
and show that the impact of openness on growth may diﬀer in the short and
long run. In particular, we show that trade restrictions can asymmetrically
accelerate growth in locations that impose taxes on imported capital goods.
Even if gains from such trade restrictions are a transitory phenomenon, their
duration can vary considerably depending on structural asymmetries and the
speciﬁcs of policy.
We construct a many country endogenous growth model and ﬁrst brieﬂy
describe the long run balanced growth solutions. Beyond comparisons of
equilibria in the long run, we solve country-speciﬁca d j u s t m e n tp a t h st h a t
follow the introduction of tariﬀs and demonstrate that, based on these short
run dynamics of temporary equilibria, a motivation for restricting trade in
capital goods can exist. The model we employ expands Evans, Honkapohja
and Romer (1998) (EHR below) and Honkapohja and Turunen-Red (2002)
(HTR) and includes several important features. We include an arbitrary
number of heterogenous countries that may diﬀer from each other in trade
policy and structural parameters (country size, factor productivity, costs of
innovation).1 T r a d eo c c u r sb o t hi n t r a - i n d u s t r yi nav a r i e t yo fd i ﬀerentiated
capital goods and inter-industry in capital goods and a homogenous aggre-
gate consumption commodity. Capital goods are technological complements
and the source of growth is the endogenous invention of new capital vari-
eties. Because productivity and proﬁtability of all capital goods improve as
more are developed and traded, there is an incentive for investment to be
1These parameters help explain international income diﬀerences. For factor produc-
tivity, see Caselli (2005), Treﬂer (1993), and Hsieh and Klenow (2007); for research pro-
ductivity, Alesina and Giavazzi (2006); for country size eﬀects, Alesina, Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2005). We do not model the foundations of parameter asymmetries. For the
contribution of geographic agglomeration, see Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001); for
diﬃcult technology transfer, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004); for social infrastructure as
a cause of productivity diﬀerences, see Hall and Jones (1999).
7synchronous (the best time to innovate and invest is when others do so), and
perceptions of proﬁt opportunities rise together with expectations growth.2
We present several numerical examples illustrating the role of tariﬀso n
capital goods in creating and sustaining growth cycles that yield asymmetric
utility gains.3 When these tariﬀs are proposed and implemented, growth ex-
pectations shift to reﬂect the expected reallocation of innovation and invest-
ment toward the protected markets. In particular, in countries with tariﬀs,
growth expectations improve and a cycle of optimism and faster growth is set
in motion. Shortsighted policy makers who are subject to limited knowledge
and emphasize growth as a policy goal (because growth of the local economy
largely determines consumption possibilities and aggregate well-being) may
well see the cycle of high growth equilibria created by tariﬀsa sap o s i t i v e
reason for imposing them.
Adaptive learning dynamics and resulting dynamics of temporary equi-
libria are applied to formalize the transition from a long run steady state
with free trade to a new steady state after the introduction of tariﬀs. At any
point in time, producers are assumed to apply expectations about the future
state of the economy so as to choose investment in innovation and production
of new capital goods. Once a temporary equilibrium is attained, discrepan-
cies between previous expectations and the observed economic performance
lead to adjustment of expectations for the subsequent time period. In the
literature, this adjustment over time is called a learning process.4 As deci-
sion makers learn and adapt over time, a sequence of temporary equilibria
converges to a balanced growth state that is a stable outcome in the learn-
ing process. During the transition and even assuming structural symmetry,
countries do not innovate or grow at the same rate nor do they attain the
same levels of technology, consumption, and utility. Countries with tariﬀs
can experience signiﬁcant gains but in the rest of the world a slowdown is
likely, yielding losses that may persist much longer than the gains to countries
with tariﬀs.
The magnitude and duration of gains from tariﬀs on capital goods depend
on many factors, including the asymmetries in structural parameters across
countries, the changes in initial expectations, and the speed at which decision
2Walz (1997, 1999) has presented a diﬀerent theoretical treatment of asymmetric trade
policy using the Grossman and Helpman (1991) approach.
3Estevadeordal and Taylor (2008) empirically observe a signiﬁcant correlation between
tariﬀs on intermediate capital goods and growth.
4For discussions of learning dynamics, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, 2009).
8makers learn. Numerical experiments indicate that gains are more likely
when the restrictions are imposed by more than one country and when the
rest of the world is at a disadvantage (with smaller markets, lower total factor
productivity, or higher innovation costs). Initial asymmetries, if any exist,
are widened during the adjustment dynamics.
Overall, results suggest that trade policy and heterogeneity in macroeco-
nomic parameters can be important not only because of their impact on long
run equilibria but also because transition dynamics can be much aﬀected.
In the present model, balanced growth solutions feature a common rate of
growth that depends on patterns of openness toward trade5 but countries
with diﬀerent structural parameters form separate (endogenous) income (-
level) clubs across which the levels of technological development, output,
consumption, and long run well-being vary.6 Numerical experiments demon-
strate the wide diﬀerences in transition paths that can appear when trade in
capital goods is restricted.
Subsequent discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and the long run balanced growth solutions. Section 3 formulates the short
run learning dynamics, and Section 4 presents the numerical experiments
and our results. Section 5 concludes.
2M o d e l
We assume that there are  (≥ 3) countries, indexed by  =1 .T h e










 0  1 (1)
where + denotes ﬁnal consumption in period ( + ). Given a constant
interest rate, , each consumer’s preferred rate of consumption growth, ,
5For empirics of growth and trade patters, see Quah (1997) and Kali, Mendez and
Reyes (2007). For preferential trade agreements and growth, Berthelon (2004).
6Waugh (2007) observes (using a static model) that asymmetries in trade costs can have
as i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on relative incomes across countries. A large literature addresses the
lack of convergence in incomes and growth between the poorest and richest countries (e.g.,
Sala-i-Martin (1996), Quah (1997)). Pritchett (2006) has suggested that the diﬀerences
can be understood using growth regimes that experience separate balanced growth states
(each with its own transition dynamics).
9is obtained from the Euler equation
+1

≡  =[ (1 + )]
1  (2)
Final consumption is produced by competitive production sectors that
employ immobile resources (labor) and domestic and imported capital goods
according to the technology function for country 














 b  ≡ 
1
1−
   1 (3)
In (3),  denotes the (ﬁxed) endowment of labor (country size) and  allows
for diﬀerences in aggregate productivity (parameters () are identical in
all  =1 ). The () give the quantities of capital goods (indexed by
) purchased from country  by the competitive production sector in coun-
try .7 The number of capital goods produced, ,d e ﬁnes the technology
level of country  at time period . The parameter 1 imposes techno-
logical complementarity between all capital varieties. Linear homogeneity of
production requires that  = .
Intra-industry trade in capital inputs takes place even if all countries are
symmetric (see HTR (2002)). Inter-industry exchange of aggregate consump-
tion and capital goods appears when structural asymmetries are present. We
assume that there are trade barriers, denoted by  (≥ 1),t h a ti m p a c ti n -
ternational trade in capital goods (imports to country  from country ); for
domestic production the barriers are set to zero ( =1 ). We regard the
trade barriers as exogenous ad valorem tariﬀs (usually expressed as (1+))
but other trade costs may partly determine  as well (in the case of tariﬀs,
all tariﬀ revenues are distributed to consumers as lump sum income).8
All competitive production sectors observe domestic prices (measured
with respect to the world market price of ﬁnal consumption which is the
freely traded numeraire) and maximize proﬁt given technology (3). Equat-
ing the marginal cost and marginal product of each capital variety, demand
7All () are treated as service ﬂows from durable capital goods owned by their
inventor producers.
8For example,  can reﬂect public infrastructure (transport and communication net-
works) and legal institutions.

















where () denotes the rental price in country  of capital varieties 
originating in country .
Intermediate capital goods are supplied by monopolistic competitive in-
ventors (without replicative innovation). A unit of each capital good is pro-
duced by converting  units of aggregate capital, denoted by ,i n t oa
speciﬁc capital variety in location  (aggregate capital is not traded). Pro-
duction is realized at the end of a time period so that, at the end of a period,
a producer in country  receives revenue ()() from sales in each
country . In the beginning of a time period, () units of  are needed
to produce the capital rented out. The rental cost for this aggregate capi-
tal is 
(),w h e r e
 is the opportunity cost of aggregate capital in












  ∈ [0 ] (5)








 )   =1  (6)
for all varieties of capital  ∈ [0 ] in location .
While the rate of technological progress is the same in all countries in
the long run, technology levels do not necessarily equate. Country-speciﬁc
technology proportionality factors, ,a r ed e ﬁned by setting
 = 1 =2 ,a n d1 ≡ 1 ∀ (7)
where 1 serves as the world technology level index over time. Using (4)
and (6)-(7) we obtain the provision of all capital varieties in all markets
( =1   6= ):




































where  =( 1) ˆ  =( 1 ) and  =( 1). Supply
of aggregate output equals













The multiplicative terms  deﬁn e di n( 9 )g i v ea ni m p o r tt a r i ﬀ and rela-
tive rental -deﬂated sum of the technology levels of a country’s trade partners
and reﬂect the accessibility of world technology to the aggregate production
sector of a country (openness factor of a country). These  determine the
impact of a country’s trade policy and trade pattern on domestic capital
goods production () and imports of intermediate capital, ceteris paribus.
The openness factors  decrease (reducing  and ) as trade barriers
()a n dt h er e l a t i v er e n t a l s( )r i s ea n dt h i se ﬀect is the larger the
higher the technology levels of the trade partners ()a n dt h el a r g e rt h e
contribution of capital goods in aggregate production (). The aggregate
output solution (10) shows that, in addition to institutional and other ex-
ogenous factors (), a country’s total factor productivity depends on its
eﬀective technology level (1). As the degree of complementarity among
capital varieties () increases, the contribution of openness becomes more
important.
Analogously to EHR (1998) and HTR (2002), we assume that the de-




of aggregate consumption. This speciﬁcation makes later innovations more
costly but, owing to capital complementarity, they are more valuable. Para-
meters  allow for diﬀerences in research productivity (variations in human
capital, institutions, and policies toward innovative activities). The extent of
innovation per time period is determined by the zero proﬁt condition of the
monopolistically competitive producers (equating the discounted monopoly












−(+1)+ =1  (11)

































1− and b  =( b 1 b ).B y( 1 2 ) ,p r o ﬁtability of
invention in a location is aﬀected by the general technology level (1)a n d
the cost of producing a unit of a capital commodity there (
). Multi-
pliers () take into account the negative impact of tariﬀ barriers against
a country’s exports in all markets () but also show the positive eﬀect of
productive size (b ), relative rentals (), and openness ()o fm a r k e t s
on proﬁtability.
The opportunity cost of general purpose capital is derived using the pro-
duction possibility frontier between ﬁnal consumption and aggregate capital,





 =1  (14)
where Γ() is a convex cost function and  equals the total investment in
aggregate capital in country  in time period ,i . e . ,









































where Γ00  0. The common cost function Γ() in (14) and (16) and the
expression for  in (15) reﬂect the sectoral structure of production that is
assumed to be the same everywhere: while aggregate technologies for capital
goods production and innovation are the same (so that  =  +  for
13all , including possible eﬃciency diﬀerences ()), (unspeciﬁed) techno-
logical diﬀerences between the monopolistically competitive sector and the
production of aggregate consumption yield the frontier (14).9
In a long run balanced growth equilibrium, the interest rate and the op-
portunity cost of aggregate capital remain constant while technology, output,
aggregate capital, and consumption grow at a common constant rate. As-
suming that the rate of technology growth is  ≡ 1+11,t h e nb y( 1 5 ) ,
aggregate capital grows at rate
 =( )
1+ (17)
and, due to (10) and (14), aggregate output and consumption grow at this
same rate. By (16),

 = Γ
0( − 1) (18)
and  is determined by the Euler equation
 =[ (1 + )]
1  (19)
S u b s t i t u t i n g( 1 2 )i n t oz e r op r o ﬁt conditions (11) and assuming that all coun-
tries innovate in equilibrium, we obtain the remaining equilibrium conditions
 =
h









b 1(;b )=b (;b ) =2  (21)







 =1  (22)
Here we introduce the notation ˆ 

=( 1 
),w h e r e =( 2), because
 is the relevant state variable (since 1 ≡ 1 as indicated in ((7))). Subse-
quently, b (;b ) for all  =1  will play an important role and
we refer to them as the countries’ relative proﬁtability parameters.10
9If technologies in all three production sectors are the same, then (14) is replaced by
the accumulation equation  =  +( +1 − ) Then 
 ≡ 1 for all  and 




)( = 1 ) reﬂects
relative proﬁtability of innovation (over innovation costs) in countries  and   =
1
14Equations (18)-(21) determine the long run growth rate () and the
level variables (2;), given the exogenous trade barriers () and
other country-speciﬁc parameters (b ). Several features of the model
contribute to the structure of the long run equilibrium. First, equations (21)
determine the allocation of innovation across countries ()s oa st om a i n t a i n
zero proﬁtability of invention everywhere despite country-speciﬁc asymme-
tries and as expansion of technology proceeds at a common rate. Because in
a steady state equations (21) are separable from the rest of the equilibrium
conditions we can solve technology levels (2) using only information
regarding tariﬀsa n d(b )11 The impact on long run growth of technology
levels, trade policies, and other parameters is transmitted by the multiplier
b 1(;b ) in (20).12 Patterns of trade inﬂuence growth because b 1()
depends on the country by country openness factors (()). Further, the
common aggregate technology between consumption and general capital (the
cost function Γ() in (14)) implies that a shared rate of growth ()a tal o n g
run equilibrium converts into a common opportunity cost of aggregate cap-
ital in (18). Because preferences are the same everywhere, common growth
in output, capital, and consumption yields, by (19), a common interest rate
in all locations.
In a steady state, technology level diﬀerences partly determine levels of
















  =1  (23)
Accordingly, a country’s relative aggregate output per eﬀective unit of labor
() is the larger the more open the country’s trade policy and the more
advanced its trade partners (). Country by country balances of pay-
ments are maintained through inter-industry trade in aggregate consumption
and capital goods, i.e., consumption equals ( =1 )
 =  − 












11Separability obtains because i) capital is assumed not to depreciate (with depreciation,
equations (14) would include additional terms and  would appear in (18)) and ii) in (21),
the common  and  terms cancel out at a steady state.
12Under full symmetry, by (21),  =1 =1  and if trade is also free, then
b 1 = b 1+

−1
15Given that initial consumption levels satisfy (24), trade remains balanced un-
der balanced growth. (Since aggregate capital () is nontraded, the capital
account equals zero everywhere.) In subsequent sections, when considering
transition dynamics we maintain balanced trade by solving aggregate con-
sumption using the equivalents of the balance of payments condition (24).











 =1  (25)
where 0 denotes the initial consumption level in location  and  is the
equilibrium growth rate.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium conditions (18)-(20). The upward
sloping curve CC graphs equation (19) in () space, while curve TT is
obtained by substituting into the technology arbitrage condition (20) the op-
portunity cost of capital ((18)) and the equilibrium technology levels from
(21).13 Steady states are found where curves CC and TT intersect, and mul-
tiple equilibria may occur (e.g., 1, 2 and 3 in Fig. 1). Multiplicity
arises should equations (21) possess more than one solution for the vector
of technology levels or if the slope of curve TT varies as depicted in Fig. 1.
Of these, the ﬁrst possibility can be ruled out under simplifying assumptions
(Lemma A1 in the Appendix) and never occurred in numerical simulations;
the slope of curve TT, however, is inﬂuenced by the complementarity para-
meter () and the sensitivity of the opportunity cost of capital to changes
in aggregate investment (Γ00) and can take both positive and negative values
(see the Appendix).14
FIGURE 1 HERE
At each balanced growth equilibrium, depending on structural hetero-
geneities, several long run income clubs may exist. Such clubs are deﬁned by
the dispersion in innovation (), output (), consumption (), and well-
being () in equilibrium.15 Example 1 oﬀers a numerical illustration; these
13Because technology levels  remain ﬁxed along the TT curve, Fig. 1 cannot depict
the short term transion dynamics that are considered in Sections 3 and 4.
14If Γ00 =0 , the TT curve is globally upward sloping and, given (2) that solve
(21), there can be two long-run steady states, but only one of them is stable under learning
(EHR (1998)). Stability of equilibria under learning is analyzed in the next section.
15The term ’income club’ refers to country groups that experience similar equilibrium
outcomes in level variables.
16balanced growth solutions, obtained assuming that all trade is free, serve as
benchmarks for the subsequent experiments.16
Example 1 (Free Trade Equilibria): Let countries  =1  1 (1 +
1)b es y m m e t r i cw i t hp a r a m e t e r s(b 11 1)( ( b 2 2 2)). Let  =
039,  =1 12,  =0 90,  =0 22, b 1 =0 0092, 1 = 1 =1 ;  =3
with 1 =2 , 2 =1 ; Γ0()=( 0 1)2 +0 2. First row of Table 1: 2 =
1 2 = 1 b 2 = b 1; second row: 2 =1 22 2 =1  b 2 =0 0070; third row:
2 =1 22 2 =1 20 b 2 =0 0070.17
TABLE 1: Free Trade Equilibria
 12 12 12    12
1 1 1 1 02012 0137 1112 1
036 131 277 159 02002 0122 1044 144
022 131 501 180 02002 0120 1037 158
1122 2111 1222 11 22
1 1 1 0 1
364 076 131 007 −017
791 076 181 010 −026
The ﬁr s tr o wo fT a b l e1g i v e sas y m m e t r i cb a l a n c e dg r o w t hs o l u t i o n
( =3 ), while on the second and third rows one country is smaller and/or
less productive than others (b 2  b 1, 2  1) with higher innovation costs
(2  1). Under symmetry, all countries innovate equally ( =1 )a n da t t a i n
equal output, consumption, and aggregate investment and the intra-industry
trade in capital goods balances. In Table 1, column 1122 compares the
volumes of intra-industry trade within the two country groups, 1 and 2;18
columns 2111 and 1222 measure intra-industry trade between countries
1 and 2; and columns 11 and 22 measure inter-industry trade
between1 and 2 ( gives the ratio of total value of capital net exports
and aggregate output in  =1 2).19
16These numerical examples do not represent a full calibration of the model. Mathe-
matica routines for all examples are available from the second author upon request.
17Table 1 gives ratios of variables so as to avoid dependence on the initial value of 1.
18Since countries 1 (2) are symmetric, 11 (22) gives the output of each capital
variety developed in 1 (2) for each market in 1 (2).
19Due to symmetry, there is no inter-industry trade within each country group.
17Two income clubs form when structural asymmetries appear. Due to the
higher cost of innovation in 2 (second row of Table 1), innovation is real-
located toward the lower cost source ( =0 36  1). Aggregate investment
expands in 1 (12 =2 77  1) and intra-industry trade is stimulated
(1122 =3 64  1). Countries 1 become net exporters of capital goods
(11  0), leading to higher consumption (12 =1 59  1)b o t h
because group 2 must export consumption as payment for capital imports
(22 = −017  0) and because 1  2 due to higher productivity in
1 (b 2  b 1). Growth is slower when a less productive and less innovative
country group is present ( =1 044  1112) and all countries experience
a lower long run level of well-being than under symmetry. However, due to
their higher consumption levels, countries 1 are considerably better oﬀ than
the rest of the world (12 =1 44  1). Diﬀerences in productivity in
capital goods production (the third row of Table 1) yield changes similar to
those arising from innovation cost asymmetries.
3L e a r n i n g D y n a m i c s
We apply adaptive learning dynamics to determine the stability properties of
long run equilibria and to obtain a description of the short run adjustment
process that follows a structural shift (e.g., the imposition of trade tariﬀs). A
model of these dynamics consists of (i) a mapping from initial expectations to
a temporary (short run) equilibrium, and (ii) a learning rule that describes
the updating of expectations based on the observed past. The short run
equilibria and the learning rule are constructed as follows.
At a given time period, producers hold expectations about the rate of
future growth, 
 ∈ R, and relative proﬁtability of innovation, b 
 ∈ R,i n
their location. Expectations about proﬁtability implicitly reﬂect expectations
about growth in other regions.20 Investment plans are formulated subject to
these expectations, taking into account the expected revenue from and the
expected cost of innovation. Corresponding to the expected zero proﬁtability
20This is because, due to (22), (13) and (9), b 
 for all  depend on perceptions about
future levels of technology () and pricing () in all locations . Learning dynamics
could be formulated by assuming that producers in each country hold expectations about
growth ()i ne v e r yl o c a t i o n(  =1 ). The speciﬁcation we follow is technically
more convenient and allows us to solve a temporary equilibrium without assuming that
individuals in diﬀerent countries are aware of each other’s expectations.




















c a nbes o l v e df o rt h er e q u i r e dr e t u r nf o ri n n o v a t i o ni ne a c hl oc a t i o n ,(
b 
).
When combined with the consumers’ Euler equations, these () determine













) =1  (27)
in each country at a temporary equilibrium and, given ,w eo b t a i nt h e




0( − 1) =1  (28)





































) − 1) =1  (30)



















Temporary equilibrium levels of aggregate output and consumption are found
using (10) and (24).
By (26)-(27), country-speciﬁc rates of growth can diﬀer during transi-
tion dynamics; the extent of realized growth in each location depends on
short run business expectations and consumer preferences regarding saving
and consumption, as well as the policy, productivity, and cost parameters.
The opportunity cost of aggregate capital and the return to innovation also
19vary depending on regional short run growth. The allocation of technologi-
cal attainment adjusts to reﬂect new innovation as expressed in (31). Given
initial expectations (
b 
) and technology levels  for  =1 ,e q u a -
tions (26)-(31) deﬁne a unique temporary equilibrium solution for each ,

,  =1 ,a n d+1=2 .21
During the short run transition, expectations are adjusted according to
speciﬁc learning rules. Using the vector notation  =( 2) introduced
in connection with equation (22) and
 ≡ (1 )

































;;)=b (;b  ) is obtained using (29) when
all realized values of , ,  and  have been substituted in for all
 =1 .
Based on (35) and (36), an adaptive learning system expresses the changes
in expectations that reﬂect deviations of realized variables at a temporary




























Equation (37) is -dimensional and speciﬁes the change in growth expecta-
tions in each location. Analogously, each of the  equations in (38) states the
21The (
b 
) obtained from (26) are unique because the right-hand side of each
equation is upward sloping in .F o rag i v e n, (27)-(31) yield unique , 
,a n d
for all  =1 
20revised expectations regarding proﬁtability of innovation. The gain parame-
ter  in (37)-(38) determines the extent to which expectations are aﬀected
by observed errors in the past.22 Equation (39) is ( − 1)-dimensional and
must be included in the learning system because vector  is a state variable
which appears in (38).
Equations (37)-(39) specify a system of learning dynamics for which the
balanced growth equilibria characterized in (18)-(20) are the ﬁxed points (see
the Appendix). Stability of equilibria is determined by the local stability of
the system (37)-(38) near each ﬁxed point. For tractability, the following
proposition states the necessary condition for stability when there are two
learners ( =1 2).23
Proposition 1: I fab a l a n c e dg r o w t he q u i l i b r i u m ,(
∗;∗
 ∗),i sc h a r a c -
terized by equations (18)-(20) and is locally stable under adaptive learning



















)  0 (40)
where () and () are the functions describing the solutions for the
interest rate from equations (26) and (27), respectively, for each  =1 2
Condition (40) is a consistency requirement on producers’ reactions to
growth expectations (in (26)) and the consumers’ willingness to invest in new
innovation in each country (in (27)); in Fig. 1, the producers’ arbitrage curve
TT must cut the consumers’ CC curve from above as shown at equilibria 1
and 3 (see the Proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix).
FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 2 illustrates the beginning of the transition process in one loca-
tion (Country 1); analogous ﬁgures can be used to depict the adjustment
elsewhere. Curve CC in Fig. 2 represents equation (27) and is the same
everywhere. As in Fig. 1, the initial steady state (∗
 ∗) is identiﬁed by
22For simplicity, we assume that gain parameters are identical across countries. One
could allow for heterogeneity in gains, see Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) and Pfajfar and
Santoro (2008).
23We have not been able to derive theoretically a useable suﬃcient condition for stability
(see the Appendix). In numerical simulations we check that the dynamics converge to a
steady state after an exogenous shift.
21the intersection of CC and the (common) technology relation, (b ∗),t h a t
is obtained from (26) by setting the expected proﬁtability levels equal to
their steady state values (b 
 = b ∗ for all ) Now suppose growth expecta-
tions in Country 1 rise in time period  (
1  ∗
 in Fig. 2). The eﬀect of
these positive expectations on realized growth depends, according to (26),
on the perceptions about relative proﬁtability of innovation (b 
)t h a tr e ﬂect
expected changes in innovation elsewhere. If proﬁtability is expected to im-
prove (b 
  ∗), curve TT shifts up (e.g., position 1(b 
1)).24 The realized
temporary equilibrium (1 1) c a nt h e nb er e a do ﬀ the 1(b 
1) and CC
curves as speciﬁed in (26)-(27). After observing 1 and 1, expectations
are adjusted as speciﬁed in (37)-(39) and a new temporary equilibrium is
obtained following an analogous process.
The magnitude of the change in realized growth depends on the initial
change in expectations (whether positive or negative) but is also aﬀected by
the shift in the  1(b 
1) curve (due to expectations about proﬁtability) and
the slope of this curve. To illustrate the shift eﬀect, (0
1 0
1) in Fig. 2 gives
the temporary equilibrium that is obtained if technological growth is not
expected to alter relative proﬁtability (b 
1 = ∗); in this case, expectations
for new proﬁt opportunities are small (no shift in the TT curve) and the
increase in growth is modest (0
1  1). Realized growth would be slower
still if growth expectations are such that curve  1(b 
1) is located below its
steady state position (∗) (not shown in Fig. 2). However, even in this
case, assuming that curve  1(b 
1) is suﬃciently steep, the short run growth
rate can be higher than the previously observed ∗
. The slope of the relevant
 curve is the larger the less the opportunity cost of capital responds to
additional capital investment (the smaller the term Γ00  0 in (51)). In other
words, the smaller the cost pressure from new investment and the better
the growth expectations, the larger the increase in growth in the short run.
The slope of the CC curve also contributes: the more willing the consumers
to save an invest (the ﬂatter the CC curve), the larger the realized growth
expansion.
24In (26), keeping 1 and 
1 ﬁxed, the right-hand side of the equation is decreasing
in b 1. Therefore, 1 must also decrease, implying that, in Fig. 2, curve TT shifts up.
(Because 
1 does not decrease when 1 increases, the adjustment of 
1 reinforces the
change.)
224 Dynamics, Expectations, and Tariﬀs
4 . 1 B a l a n c e dg r o w t he q u i l i b r i aw i t ht a r i ﬀs
Economic intuition and previous results suggest that restrictions on interna-
tional exchange of capital goods slow down growth in the long run.25
Proposition 2: Near stable long run equilibria, an increase in any tariﬀ
on trade in intermediate capital goods lowers the balanced growth rate.
The extent of the growth reduction depends on the size of the tariﬀ in-
crease, where the policy change is implemented, and how the technology
trade patterns are altered (openness factors () aﬀect growth through b 1()
in (20)). Complementarity of capital goods supports coordination to lower
growth in the long run. This is because a reduction in demand for some cap-
ital goods, caused by new trade restrictions, reduces demand for all capital
varieties, slowing down innovation everywhere.
Example 2 (Tariﬀs): The parameters are as in Example 1 on each row
of Table 2a; countries 1 form a customs union and adopt a uniform tariﬀ
(1 =1 1) against capital goods imports from the rest of the world (2).
TABLE 2a: Equilibria with Tariﬀs, 1 =1 1
 12 12 12    12
062 099 178 109 02009 0134 1097 107
021 131 521 180 02001 0120 1037 158
013 131 942 196 02001 0119 1033 169
1122 2111 1222 11 22
162 100 086 007 −014
617 076 113 010 −027
1339 076 113 012 −032
Comparing Tables 1 (free trade) and 2a (customs union) the negative
eﬀect of the tariﬀ on long run growth is apparent. The largest reduction
in growth occurs when all countries are symmetric (ﬁrst row of Tables 1
25For example, in Walz (1997: Theorem 2), a liberalization of capital goods trade speeds
up growth in the long run; in HTR (2002), common tariﬀs on trade in intermediate capital
goods shift the long run equilibrium toward lower growth.
23and 2a). In this case, the tariﬀ creates two income clubs with diﬀerent out-
put, investment, consumption, and utility levels. When two income clubs
exist under free trade (rows two and three of Tables 1 and 2a), the tariﬀ
exacerbates the asymmetries in level variables but the growth reduction is
smaller. In all cases, the share of the customs union of the world innovation,
total investment, and consumption increases. Intra-industry trade within
the customs union expands while the rest of the world increasingly exports
aggregate consumption so as to purchase capital goods from the customs
union. The customs union gains relatively (12 increases) but, because
long run well-being mainly depends on growth (in (25)), all countries suﬀer
al o s sw h e nat a r i ﬀ is employed. Table 2b shows the aggregate utility levels
under alternative tariﬀ conﬁgurations when all countries are symmetric.26
Table 2b: Long Run Utility (Symmetry)
2 =1 2 =1 1
1 =1 686686 509527
1 =1 1 441413 349333
The diagonal entries of Table 2b show the free trade utility levels ( =
1=1 2) and the outcome when both the customs union and the rest of
the world impose a tariﬀ (1 = 2 =1 1).T h e o ﬀ-diagonal entries state
the long run utility levels when trade restrictions are asymmetric. Because a
smaller proportion of technology trade is aﬀected in these cases, utility losses
are smaller, but never is there a utility-based argument for interfering with
technology trade: all restrictions make everyone worse oﬀ in the long run.
4.2 Short run dynamics
Despite the negative eﬀect of trade barriers on balanced growth, one may
wonder about the short run adjustment toward a new equilibrium. Adjust-
ment paths may signiﬁcantly vary, country by country, depending on policy
speciﬁcs and structural parameters. Perhaps asymmetric gains of some du-
ration are perceived to exist from policy that is unhelpful from the long run
perspective?
26In Table 2b, the initial technology level has been set at 10 =1 . When countries are
asymmetric (rows two and three of Tables 1 and 2a), results analogous to Table 2b are
obtained.
24Example 3 (Tariﬀ Induced Learning Dynamics): Ac u s t o m su n i o n
(CU) (1 =2 ) adopts a uniform tariﬀ ( =1 1) against the rest of the world
(ROW) (2 =1 ). The parameters in Tables 3a and 3b are as in Example 1,
rows 1 and 2, respectively; 10 =1 ;  =0 1=1 2.27
TABLE 3: Initial Parameters for Short Run Dynamics





























We assume that a free trade equilibrium has prevailed up to time period
( − 1);t h eﬁrst four rows of Tables 3 state the corresponding growth rate,
long run utility, relative allocation of innovation, and the relative proﬁtability
of innovation (see Table 1). Between time periods ( − 1) and , the change
in trade barriers is announced and implemented. We treat this change as
being partly anticipated by economic agents, i.e., aspects of the new policy
were publicly proposed and discussed, and this leads to some immediate
changes in expectations.28 The ﬁf t hr o w so fT a b l e s3g i v et h en e wg r o w t h
expectations for time period : the customs union is expected to grow faster
(
1  ), whereas a slowdown is expected in the rest of the world (
2 
). While the direction of these expectations can be justiﬁed by appealing
to the anticipated reallocation of investment and innovation from the rest
27The gain parameter is larger than observed in empirical studies where  ∈ (002005)
(e.g., Evans, Honkapohja and Mitra (2009), p. 937). This is because the model does not
include random shocks which would be ﬁltered out by agents, justifying lower values of
.
28Shifts in initial expectations that are due to changes in policy have appeared in macro-
economic literature. Feldstein (1982) emphasizes changes in expectations that may be
caused by ﬁscal policy. Eggertsson (2008) argues that recovery from the Great Depression
was driven by a large shift in expectations caused by President Roosevelt’s monetary and
ﬁscal policies. Evans, Honkapohja and Mitra (2009) analyze learning dynamics arising
from anticipated policy changes in cases where the structure of the change is fully known
in advance.
25of the world toward the customs union, the particular values of 
 can be
thought of as imprecise guesses about future growth that producers of capital
goods may form based on rough projections of output (see the Appendix for
the calculations). Expectations about the relative proﬁtability of innovation
(last row of Tables 3) do not need to be consistent with growth expectations
but we have chosen approximate values using the given 
 in (31) and (29)
for  =1 2. In Table 3a, b 
1b 
2 =1 065 s h o w i n ga ne x p e c t e dr i s ei nr e l a t i v e
proﬁtability of innovation in the customs union following the imposition of




Figures 3 show the features of the short run adjustment paths that are
most interesting (solid line = CU, thin line = ROW, dotted line = free
trade).29 Whether the structural parameters are symmetric (Fig. 3a, i)) or
asymmetric (Fig. 3b, i)), the customs union experiences an acceleration in
growth while growth in the rest of world slows down signiﬁcantly; over time,
both approach the new balanced growth state (see Table 2) but fast growth
in the customs union, exceeding the growth rate under free trade, persists for
many time periods. During the transition, innovation and investment expand
in the customs union ( declines while the relative capital stock 12 in-
creases). There is an initial dip in the consumption level of the customs union
(Figures 3a, ii) and 3b, ii)) that is due to higher investment but, because of
fast growth and expanding imports from the rest of the world, consumption
eventually attains and exceeds the free trade level. Consumption in the rest
of the world expands over time because local investment spending ebbs.
Figures 3a, iii) and 3b, iii) aggregate the impact on growth and consump-
tion using utility as perceived in a location at each point in time.30 The
utility levels are calculated using equation (25) where consumption ()a n d
growth () as realized at temporary equilibria are substituted in ( =1 2).
This method of determining aggregate well-being in the short run is con-
sistent with the learning dynamics formulation: at every point in time, the
current temporary equilibrium is viewed by decision makers as a new bal-
anced growth state and the corresponding utility index is given in (25).31 We
29In Figs. 3, the change in tariﬀs occurs between time periods 0 and 1.
30This notion of anticipated utility was suggested by Kreps (1995) and is further ana-
lyzed, for example, in Cogley and Sargent (2008).
31Utility along the free trade path is also obtained from (25):  is given by the free
trade equilibrium and  = −1 for all 
26obtain
Result 3: Along the transition path, countries that restrict trade in cap-
ital goods can experience both higher growth and higher perceived utility than
under free trade.
When all countries are initially symmetric (Fig. 3a, iii)), the gains for the
customs union persist for sixteen time periods but, under initial asymmetry
(Fig. 3b, iii)), the perceived utility of the customs union never dips below the
free trade path even after one hundred and forty time periods. These utility
comparisons diﬀer from Table 2b where each utility number is calculated
once, at the beginning of an equilibrium path. In Figs. 3, every temporary
equilibrium (at each )d e ﬁnes a new starting point for a utility evaluation,
yielding a path of perceived utility over time.
The perceived utility paths of the customs union and the rest of the
world emphasize the asymmetric impact of the tariﬀ in diﬀerent locations.
When structural symmetry is assumed, two income clubs quickly emerge
with very diﬀerent transition paths. While the customs union does better in
utility terms than under free trade, the rest of the world suﬀers a large and
prolonged loss, both with respect to the free trade path and in comparison to
the customs union. Even when growth equalizes in the long run, diﬀerences
in level variables remain and convert to long-lasting relative gains for the
customs union (see column 12 in Tables 1 and 2a). On the other hand, if
the rest of the world begins at a disadvantage, slow growth there exacerbates
the diﬀerence in aggregate utility levels. Comparison of Figs. 3a, iii) and 3b,
iii) yields
Result 4: Gains in perceived utility (over free trade) persist longer when
the tariﬀ is imposed by countries that have an advantage in market size,
productivity, or innovation costs (larger b ,l o w e r).
Interestingly, the loss for the rest of the world, when compared to its free
trade (utility) path, is less severe in Fig. 3b, iii). This is because, under the
asymmetry assumption, innovation is more expensive there. Given this, the
tariﬀ induced reallocation of innovation toward the customs union makes it
possible for consumption level in the rest of the world to rise faster, alleviating
the impact on local utility.
The previous example demonstrates that, in a growth model, there can
exist perceived gains of some duration that are due to barriers on capital
27goods trade. These gains appear on the transition path toward a new steady
s t a t ea sg r o w t he x p e c t a t i o n sa r ea l t e r e di nv i e wo ft h en e wp o l i c y .T h ep e r -
ceived gains may serve as a basis of policy making by shortsighted decision
makers for whom economic growth is important (because it largely deter-
mines utility). Such policy makers perceive that a tariﬀ against imports in
the innovating, growth inducing sector aﬀects producers’ growth expecta-
tions, leading to faster local expansion at the subsequent temporary equilib-
ria. With initial perceptions so conﬁrmed, learning dynamics can create a
self-referential cycle of local optimism, observed faster growth, and sustained
positive expectations that lasts for some time.
The duration and size of the utility gains to the customs union are of
special interest. In determining these, the initial reactions in expectations
that follow a tariﬀ proposal, the subsequent adjustment of expectations, the
nature and size of the change in the trade barriers, and the structural para-
meters of the country economies all play a role. Figure 2 of Section 3 can be
used to understand the relative eﬀects.
First, as to expectations, we can state32
Result 5: (i) The larger the initial change in expectations (
),t h el a r g e r
the eﬀect on observed growth and perceived utility in the short run, ceteris
paribus, but expected changes in relative proﬁtability of innovation (b 
) also
matter. (ii) The slower the pace of learning (the smaller the gain parameter
), the larger and longer lasting the perceived gains for the customs union.
In Fig. 2, high growth expectations (large 
 vs. ∗
)r a i s et h er a t eo f
o b s e r v e dg r o w t hi nt h en e x tt i m ep e r i o d( ). However, a tariﬀ is likely to re-
duce the innovation share of other countries (lowering )a n dt h i sm a yw o r k
toward lower expected proﬁtability (b 
) everywhere, shifting down (b 
)
and slowing down growth at temporary equilibria. On the other hand, ex-
pected proﬁtability of innovation may rise in the customs union because
the relative price of capital goods, 12, will increase with higher local
growth. Thus, for countries in the customs union, expectations about local
growth and future proﬁtability may work in the same or opposite directions
depending on the relative importance of innovation in the rest of the world
(for countries in the rest of the world, both expectations work toward lower
32The numerical examples that support the subsequent results are described in a tech-
nical appendix that is available from the authors upon request.
28growth). If the rest of the world is smaller and/or less innovative, any ad-
verse eﬀects arising from the tariﬀ are less likely to aﬀect expectations in the
customs union, raising the growth spike there.
The gain parameters of the learning dynamics are important in shaping
the transition. E.g., if gain parameters are reduced by half, the number of
time periods over which the customs union enjoys faster growth and higher
perceived utility nearly triples (assuming symmetry). If the gain parameters
are smaller in the rest of the world, the period of disproportionate gains for
the customs union is somewhat shorter.33
Two aspects of the tariﬀ policy matter:
Result 6: (i) The perceived gains from the tariﬀ decline as the tariﬀ rate
increases, ceteris paribus, but, because initial growth expectations may also
change and structural asymmetries play a role, the overall eﬀect is uncertain.
(ii) For the same set of initial expectations, a country gains more in perceived
utility by imposing a tariﬀ as a member of a customs union than by choosing
the tariﬀ unilaterally.
In Fig. 2, a higher tariﬀ tends to shift down curves (b 
) and this
lowers observed growth. The negative eﬀect works through changes in ex-
pectations about proﬁtability of innovation ( is likely to decline, reducing
() and b 
). But, these negative eﬀects may be counterbalanced by higher
growth expectations (a higher tariﬀ is likely to cause a larger reallocation of
innovation and investment in favor of the countries with the tariﬀ)a n di n
such a case, a higher tariﬀ barrier may increase gains for the customs union
(b 
1 may also rise because 12 can be expected to increase). Structural
asymmetries create additional room for countries with an advantage to raise
tariﬀs.34 Experiments suggest that, when the rest of the world is smaller
with higher innovation costs, gains in perceived utility persist in the customs
union for many periods even when trade barriers are raised but disappear
more quickly if structural symmetry is assumed.
Membership in a customs union creates larger perceived gains because
of the larger distortion of trade that occurs in the case of a unilateral tariﬀ
33The magnitude of the gain parameters has been empirically linked to population in-
come (Pfajfar and Santoro (2008)). This suggests applying lower gain parameters in the
rest of the world if this area is assumed to be smaller and less productive.
34Recall that perceived utility gains persist longer when the tariﬀ is imposed by countries
that have an advantage in market size, productivity or innovation costs (Result 4).
29(within a customs union, instead of all imports of capital goods being aﬀected
by the tariﬀ, only those from nonmember countries are). Being a member of
a customs union may also help in that initial expectations about proﬁtability
of innovation are more positive when the rest of the world is smaller.
On the other hand, if a unilateral tariﬀ is imposed by a country that is at a
structural disadvantage (small, less productive, with high innovation costs),
any perceived utility gains are likely to be very short-lived and small. In
experiments, even a strong initial acceleration in growth cannot signiﬁcantly
raise perceived utility if the high costs of innovation necessitate a large
sacriﬁce in local consumption. Among structural parameters, technological
complementarity of capital goods supports proﬁtability of all investment and
creates an incentive for new innovation to be synchronized. We observe that
when initial expectations are kept ﬁxed, the gain in perceived utility is the
larger and lasts the longer the higher the degree of complementarity between
capital inputs.
Because aggregate utility in a growth model is determined by the level
of consumption and the rate at which consumption possibilities expand,
the above results are not based on domestic reallocation of production and
changes in the distribution of income (Stolper and Samuelson eﬀects), nor
are changes in the terms of trade central (the optimal tariﬀ argument).35
Rather, utility gains are created along the dynamic transition path that in-
cludes a reallocation of new innovation and investment toward countries that
restrict imports of intermediate capital goods. Tariﬀs raise local growth ex-
pectations and accelerate growth, thus supporting self-referential cycles of
positive expectations and high growth.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We show that transition dynamics can create asymmetric transitional growth
and utility gains in countries that choose to restrict trade in capital goods.
The magnitude and duration of these gains depend on many factors and
their existence is not guaranteed. Gains are more likely to exist if growth
35Ossa (2009) has observed that a tariﬀ in an imperfectly competitive (static) model
can be motivated by a relocation eﬀect (a utility increase that occurs when the variety of
domestically produced (diﬀerentiated) consumption goods that are not subject to the tariﬀ
increases). The relocation eﬀect does not exist in the present model because production
of capital goods only occurs in the location of their invention.
30expectations react strongly to the tariﬀ and if learning dynamics are not fast.
Gains are also more likely when the tariﬀ distortion aﬀects a smaller fraction
of trade in capital goods, i.e., when the tariﬀ is imposed by a customs union
(with free internal trade) or if the tariﬀ is used by a large and productive
economy with low innovation costs against a smaller and less productive rest
of the world. Negative eﬀects of a tariﬀ are reduced by complementarity of
capital goods.
Transition paths of diﬀerent countries are not alike. In all experiments
and even assuming complete structural symmetry, a modest tariﬀ against
capital exports of the rest of the world results in an immediate and relatively
large reduction in local growth and utility in rest of the world that persists
longer than gains to the countries with the tariﬀ. If structural asymmetries
are present, disadvantages of the rest of the world are widened. Somewhat
disturbingly, the incentive for a tariﬀto be imposed appears to be the stronger
the larger the asymmetries in favor of the countries that would limit trade.
In the long run, the pace of growth equalizes but, even assuming initial
symmetry, this does not remove diﬀerences in level variables that remain
and convert to long-lasting relative utility losses for the rest of the world.
We have assumed that the basic technology parameters of all countries
remain the same over time. If, for example, the local cost of innovation were
to rise as less new innovation takes place in the rest of the world (due to some
learning by doing eﬀects that we have not modeled), then the impact of tariﬀs
could be worse in these countries (the world as a whole would grow slower in
the long run). On the other hand, if organizational innovation or diﬀusion
of such organization were to occur, productivity and cost diﬀerences could
decline over time, allowing for more complete convergence in level outcomes.36
There is also the possibility that the adjustment to the long run steady
state may include a large downward jump in growth and well-being (HTR
(2002)). But irrespective of the magnitude of the eventual eﬀect, results
indicate that patterns of trade in capital goods can be a determinant of the
aggregate growth state in the world economy. Fluctuations in trade policy
may cause variations in growth that include both asymmetric short run eﬀects
and long run changes that conform to the usual intuition.
36Trade restrictions may slow such diﬀusion and if diﬀerences in social infrastructure
explain initial asymmetries, convergence of parameters may be very slow.
316 Appendix
Lemma A.1: Let countries  =1 21 (1 +1 ) be symmetric with
parameters (b 1 1 1) ((b 22 2)).L e tt h eﬁrst 1 countries impose a com-
mon tariﬀ  (≥ 1) against capital goods from the rest of the world. Then,
f o ra n ys e to fp a r a m e t e r sa n dt a r i ﬀ, there is a unique (positive) solution
 ≡   = 1 +1 for equations (21).
Proof: By (9) and (13) at a steady state,
1 = 1b 1












1− + 2b 2

2  (42)
1 = 1 + 2(21)

−1 2 = 1(12)

−1 + 2 (43)















































At the lower limit of this interval, ()()=0 ,a n d()() grows arbi-
trarily large as  approaches the upper limit. By continuity, there is a 0
that solves (44).
































2  0 (49)
Thus, () is decreasing in  but at a decreasing rate, and () increases at
an increasing rate (0() becoming arbitrarily large as  approaches its upper












































i.e., ()() is increasing. For larger values of , ()() remains increasing
because 00()  0 so that () decreases at a lower rate than at the lower
limit for  but () grows at an ever faster rate as  increases. ¥
Slope of the TT curve: Given the parameters and =2 












































−1 ( 0) (54)
T h eT Tc u r v ec a nh a v ean e g a t i v es l o p ei ft h en u m e r a t o ri n( 5 1 )i sn e g a t i v e
(Γ00  0 is large relative to ). See HTR (2002: p. 502-503 and the Appendix)
for a further discussion.




































) are obtained using (26) - (27). Equations (55)-(56) imply
that all realized  and b  are equal to their respective expected values.
Thus, by (37)-(38), all expectations remain unchanged and so do the realized
values of  and b . But, if none of these variables can change, none of 
can change and then  =  for all  and, by (55),  =  for all ; ﬁnally,
by (26), b ()=b 1() which determines the equilibrium values of .
Proof of Proposition 1: Assume that there are two learners (a customs
union and the rest of the world). The customs union () consists of 1
symmetric countries ( =1 2 1) and imposes a uniform tariﬀ  ( 1)
against imported capital goods from the rest of the world ()( 2 (≡  −1)




2) and (b 
1b 









































































As the model is non-stochastic, this system can be analyzed a vector diﬀer-
ence equation, and local stability of a steady state can be examined using its
linearization.
34Before proceeding to linearization, we note the following explicit structure
(dropping constant parameters from argument, changing arguments to scalar

































−1 + 2b 2

2] (64)




 . In addition,





















































−1  0 (68)
2














































































































−1 ( 0) (73)
The sign of 
 is positive if Γ00 =0but can be negative if CDΓ00 in (71)

































































































































−1 + 2b 2

2]  0
The linearized system, evaluated at a ﬁxed point, equals
⎛

































⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
( − 1) + 1 0  00
0 ( − 1) + 1 0  0
1 2 3 +1 4 5
1 2 3 4 +1 5
1 1 2 2 1
⎞







































































































 0, 2 =

∗





Next, we obtain some relationships among the elements of Ω.O n eh a s





















































()1 = 3 +1 
()1 = 3
Using these relationships, the matrix Ω has two eigenvalues equal to 1 − ,
one eigenvalue equal to 1+(  − 1) while the two remaining eigenvalues
satisfy a quadratic. With  ∈ (01) the ﬁrst two eigenvalues are inside the
unit circle. The third eigenvalue is also inside if and only if







A∗ =1 2 (84)
Thus, the necessary condition for stability of (37)-(39) is (40). In (84), 1A∗
gives the slope of curve CC in Fig. 1, whereas 
 is the slope of the
TT curve.¥
We remark that the remaining two eigenvalues may or may not be stable,
i.e., they may lie inside or outside the unit circle. Therefore, in the numerical
examples we have veriﬁed convergence of the dynamics directly by simulating
the nonlinear diﬀerence equation system (58)-(62).
38P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :It suﬃces to show that an increase in any







































where  are deﬁned in (9). Thus, b 1  0 for all  =1  (1 ≡ 1).










































































By (86)-(87), an exogenous increase in any tariﬀ =1  ( 6= ),
that reduces exports of country  to country  must lower the equilibrium
value of . (For example, if country 1 imposes a uniform tariﬀ against all
capital imports and then raises that tariﬀ,a l l ( =2 )m u s td e c l i n e . )
Then, since b 1  0 for all ,a ni n c r e a s ei na n yt a r i ﬀ must reduce




2) and (b 
1b 
2) : Consider producers in the
proposed CU. They have observed 11 and 21 and 11 = 21 = 22 = 12
initially. The total output of each producer in both CU countries equals
211 + 21 (= 2(01559) + 01559 = 04677) (when 1 =1 ). Given (8),






1− =1 1575 (88)
so that 12 ≈ 01347 when  =1 1 Assuming that domestic production takes
the place of imports, 11 ≈ 01559 + 0021 = 01771. Exports to the other
CU country are not expected to change due to the internal free trade of the



























keeping ,  and  constant. Thus, the estimated total output of each CU
producer equals 01771 + 01559 + 01564 = 04894 which corresponds to a
464% increase in the output of capital goods. To guess the impact on growth





 =  at a steady state. Thus, an initial growth estimate
larger than approximately +4% can be sustained.
In the ROW, producers estimate 12 ≈ 01347 The total output of capital
goods per producer is 01559 + 2(01347) = 04253 which corresponds to a
906% reduction. The growth expectations in Table 3b have been determined
analogously. The expected values of b 
1 and b 
2 are obtained using (29) where
, ,a n d
 are solved using (
1 
2)
4041FIGURE  3a, i):  Growth in the Customs Union and the Rest of the 
World Compared to Free Trade
42FIGURE 3a, ii):  Consumption in the Customs Union and the Rest of the 
World Compared to Free Trade
FIGURE 3a, iii): Perceived Utility in the Customs Union and the Rest of the 
World Compared to Free Trade
43FIGURE 3b, i):  Growth in the Customs Union and the Rest 
of the World Compared to Free Trade
FIGURE 3b, ii): Consumption in the Customs Union and the Rest of the 
Word Compared to Free Trade
44FIGURE 3b, iii):  Utility in the Customs Union and the Rest of 
the World Compared to Free Trade
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